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1THE ANXIETY OF SOVEREIGNTY: BRITAIN,
THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Douglas E. Edlin*
Abstract: This Article examines the development of the International
Criminal Court, outlines the positions of and disagreements between
Britain and the United States concerning the ICC, and analyzes the
speciªc objections to the ICC raised by the United States. In this
discussion, the Article argues that the contrasting positions of Britain and
the United States toward the ICC can be understood in terms of each
nation’s differently conªgured perception of its own sovereign power. For
various reasons, Britain’s sovereignty is tested most acutely by its
relationship with the European Union, while the United States feels its
sovereignty encroached primarily by its relationship with the United
Nations. Britain and the United States share a commitment to consti-
tutionalism and this commitment has grounded Anglo-American support
for international war crimes tribunals in the past. In the end, the ICC
raises the question whether constitutionalism is a domestic or a universal
conception.
Introduction
The United States and Britain disagree about several legal issues
with a political dimension, or political issues with a legal dimension,
ranging from landmines to climate change.1 But unlike disagreements
over the Ottawa Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, given both na-
                                                                                                                     
* Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Dickinson College. This Article
was prepared for the conference on the U.S.-U.K. Special Relationship: Past, Present and Fu-
ture, which took place in Carlisle, Pennsylvania (Nov. 17–19, 2004) and in Shrivenham and
London, England (Apr. 12–14, 2005), and for The U.S.-U.K. Special Relationship at the Start of
the 21st Century ( Jeffrey McCausland & Douglas Stuart eds., 2005). I am grateful to the
conference participants for stimulating discussion, helpful comments, and warm collegial-
ity.
1 See, e.g., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, early draft reprinted at 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter the Kyoto
Protocol] (ratiªed by Britain but not by the United States); Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter the Ottawa Convention] (ratiªed
by Britain but not by the United States).
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tions’ shared cultural, historical, and constitutional commitments to
the rule of law and judicial independence as a means of securing fun-
damental values and governmental accountability, the disagreement
between Britain and the United States over the International Criminal
Court (ICC) seems especially unexpected. As this Article will explain,
the nations’ divergent positions toward the ICC are perhaps not as
surprising as it ªrst appears.
This Article examines the development of the International
Criminal Court, outlines the positions of, and disagreements between,
Britain and the United States concerning the ICC, and analyzes the
speciªc objections to the ICC raised by the United States. This Article
will argue that the contrasting positions of Britain and the United
States toward the ICC can be understood in terms of each nation’s
differently conªgured perception of its own sovereign power. For
various reasons, Britain’s sovereignty is tested most acutely by its rela-
tionship with the European Union (EU),2 while the United States
feels its sovereignty encroached primarily by its relationship with the
United Nations.3
I. The Origins and Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court
The ICC traces its antecedents back, ultimately, to the Nuremberg
Trials (Nuremberg).4 British leaders had grave doubts about the
efªcacy of an international tribunal; the ofªcial British position toward
the punishment of identiªed war criminals from 1943 until the end of
                                                                                                                     
2 See generally R v. Sec’y of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), [1991]
1 AC 603; Danny Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics
178-227 (2001); Paul Craig, Britain in the European Union, in The Changing Constitution
61, 69–79 ( Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2000).
3 See, e.g., Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International Meddling: An
Increasingly Difªcult Task, 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 299, 308 (2002) (“[T]he United Nations’
attempts to institutionalize intrusions into United States decision-making present a threat
every bit as real to United States sovereignty as was posed previously by the Soviet Un-
ion.”); Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Former Yugo-
slavia, 6 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 127, 138 n.46 (1995).
4 See generally Andrew Clapham, Issues of Complexity, Complicity and Complementarity: From
the Nuremberg Trials to the Dawn of the New International Criminal Court, in From Nuremberg
to the Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice 30–67 (Philippe Sands
ed., 2003) [hereinafter From Nuremberg to the Hague]; Marcella David, Grotius Repudi-
ated: The American Objections to the International Criminal Court and the Commitment to Interna-
tional Law, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 337, 346–54 (1999).
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the war was summary execution.5 Nevertheless, Nuremberg and the
aftermath of World War II generated international awareness of and
momentum for the creation of an international legal tribunal to prose-
cute and punish those responsible for war crimes.6 After Nuremberg,
and in light of persistent questions about the legal legitimacy of those
proceedings,7 the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly appointed
a body of experts to organize and codify international legal principles.
In particular, this International Law Commission (ILC) was asked to
draft a statute instituting an international criminal court along with an
international criminal code, the so-called “Nuremberg Principles,”
which would be enforced by the international criminal tribunal.8
These efforts culminated in the ILC’s draft statute for the crea-
tion of an international criminal court in 1994. Two years later, the
ILC completed its draft international criminal code. As background
to the ILC’s work, international pressure was building for the creation
of tribunals to try individuals in connection with the human rights
atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. This was followed in 1994 by a
United Nations Security Council resolution to create a second ad hoc
tribunal as a result of the genocidal activities in Rwanda.9
Building on the ILC’s draft statute and referencing the two ad hoc
tribunals as prototypes, the U.N. General Assembly issued resolutions
that led to the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Es-
tablishment of an International Criminal Court, which met in Rome
beginning on June 15, 1998.10 On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court was signed by 120 states, with
twenty-one abstentions and seven objections, including that of the
United States.11 The ICC was formally created upon the ratiªcation of
the Rome Statute by sixty states and entered into force on July 1,
2002.12
                                                                                                                     
5 See Richard Overy, The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making, in From
Nuremberg to the Hague, supra note 4.
6 See generally Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance 149–73 (2000).
7 See generally Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials 155–
79 (1986).
8 See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal
Court 8 (2nd ed. 2004).
9 Id. at 11.
10 Background Information, http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
12 International Criminal Court, Historical Introduction, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/
ataglance/history.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
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Four crimes may be prosecuted before the ICC: genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.13 These crimes are un-
derstood to possess an intrinsic international dimension as a result of
their scope and extraordinary inhumanity, which raise a concern for
all nations.14 The jurisdictional limitation of the ICC to these four
crimes links it to its historical predecessor at Nuremberg because all
four of these crimes were also prosecuted in some form at the Nur-
emberg Trials.15 Also, like Nuremberg, the ICC was created to provide
a forum for prosecution of leaders and organizers most responsible
for these crimes, not lower-level functionaries.16 Indeed, the Rome
Statute speciªcally rejects ofªcial capacity as a bar to prosecution and
highlights the potential criminal responsibility of commanders and
other superiors.17 At the same time, the ICC hearkens back to Nur-
emberg by expressly precluding exculpation for core crimes through
the defense that someone was “just following orders.”18 Finally, the
ICC contains explicit provisions that preclude the legal and theoreti-
cal challenges raised concerning the legitimacy of Nuremberg. By
speciªc, separate articles, the ICC incorporates the principles of nul-
lum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege and a prohibition against ex post
facto criminalization.19
The ICC is most sharply distinguished from its predecessor tribu-
nals by its jurisdictional mandate. Unlike the Nuremberg tribunal and
the Yugoslav and Rwandan ad hoc tribunals,20 the ICC’s jurisdiction is
consensual and complementary. In other words, the states that have
consented to the jurisdiction of the ICC have consented to permit
prosecutions of crimes committed on their soil or by their citizens in a
supranational court.21 The ICC’s jurisdiction, however, only comple-
ments or supplements the authority of a state’s national courts.22 The
                                                                                                                     
13 Interestingly, there was overwhelming support for including the ªrst three crimes
within the ICC’s jurisdiction. The crime of aggression was ultimately included, “despite the
knowledge that no agreement could be reached at the [Rome] conference either on its
deªnition or on the role of the Security Council.” Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 22, 30 (1999).
14 See Schabas, supra note 8, at 26.
15 See id. at 26–27.
16 Id. at 29.
17 See Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 27–28.
18 See id. art. 33.
19 See id. art. 11. The English translation of the phrase nullum crimen sine lege is “no crime
without law,” and the translation of the phrase nulla poena sine lege is “no penalty without law.”
20 See Arsanjani, supra note 13, at 24 n.13.
21 Id. at 26.
22 Id. at 24.
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ICC assumes jurisdiction over trials for the four core crimes when,
and only when, the national judiciary of the state in question is un-
willing or unable to proceed.23
II. British and American Positions Regarding the ICC
Britain’s support was pivotal to the creation of the ICC. Beginning
with the formative discussions in 1997 of the Preparatory Committee
on the Creation of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom), Brit-
ain agreed to withdraw the demand that ICC proceedings would de-
pend upon prior U.N. Security Council approval. This dramatic shift
altered the course of the negotiations and was a departure from the
American position,24 although the issue of predicate referral would re-
turn and remain contentious in Rome.25 In addition, in contrast to
other Security Council members, Britain joined the so-called “like-
minded group” (LMG) of smaller and mid-level states that wished the
ICC to be a strong and inºuential court.26 Britain signed the Rome
Statute on November 30, 1998 and ratiªed it on October 4, 2001.27
As the varying and contradictory formal postures of the United
States toward the ICC indicate, American attitudes toward the ICC have
been decidedly ambivalent. This ambivalence is further demonstrated
by the decision of the United States to vote against the Rome Statute
when it was initially adopted on July 17, 1998. The United States then
chose to sign the Rome Statute on the ªnal day it remained open for
signature, December 31, 2000.28 The United States then reversed its
position again and “unsigned” the Rome Statute on May 6, 2002.29
                                                                                                                     
23 See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17(1)(a) The conditional nature of ICC juris-
diction is referred to as “complementarity” or “admissibility.” See generally Schabas, supra
note 8, at 68; Arsanjani, supra note 13, at 24–25, 27–28.
24 See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National
Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 383, 429 n.225 (1998). The
United States believed that prosecution before the ICC should be predicated upon a refer-
ral by the Security Council or a state party to the treaty. See David J. Scheffer, The United
States and the International Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 12, 15 (1999).
25 See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Crimi-
nal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 2, 8 (1999). In the end, referral was
maintained in the Statute. ICC jurisdiction depends upon a referral from the Security
Council, a state party, or the ICC independent prosecutor. See Rome Statute, supra note 11,
art. 13.
26 Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 25, at 4; Arsanjani, supra note 13, at 23.
27 Schabas, supra note 8, at 419.
28 Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89,
97 (2003).
29 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law
and the U.S. Constitution, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1989, 2000 (2004).
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The United States followed its repudiation of the ICC with the en-
actment of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA),
which ensures (so far as U.S. domestic law and policy are concerned)
that no American soldier or government ofªcial will be subject to ICC
jurisdiction.30 In fact, section 7423 of ASPA speciªcally precludes any
American court, state entity, or agency from supporting or assisting the
ICC, and it prevents any agent of the ICC from conducting any investi-
gative activity on American territory.31 Where American and allied
forces conduct joint operations in which an American is under the
command of a state party national, ASPA authorizes the President to
attempt to reduce the risk of American exposure to ICC jurisdiction.32
As a preemptive tactic, the United States has entered into bilateral
agreements with dozens of nations in an effort to guarantee that these
nations will never refer any American for prosecution before the ICC
and has conditioned American participation in multinational military
operations upon international immunization from ICC prosecution.33
III. United States Objections to the ICC
American reluctance to join the ICC might seem peculiar, given
that the ICC was originally an American idea.34 The ICC has been ac-
cepted by the other Allied nations and Security Council members that
formed the Nuremberg tribunal (Britain, France, Russia), every NATO
nation (except Turkey) and Mexico. Nevertheless, the ICC was per-
ceived by certain inºuential government ofªcials as a “threat to Ameri-
can sovereignty and international freedom of action.”35 This perceived
threat related, at least according to these ofªcials, to the prospect of the
ICC restricting the United States (regardless of whether the United
States subjected itself to ICC jurisdiction) from pursuing certain force-
ful responses to acts of aggression out of fear of prosecution before the
ICC. As these ofªcials put it, “the last thing America’s leaders need is an
                                                                                                                     
30 American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7433 (2005).
31 Id. §§ 7423(b), 7423(h).
32 See Lilian V. Faulhaber, American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 40 Harv. J. on
Legis. 537, 546 (2003).
33See Sean D. Murphy, Efforts to Obtain Immunity from ICC for U.S. Peacekeepers, 96 Am. J.
Int’l L. 706, 725 (2002). See generally S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1,
2003).
34 Michael A. Newton, Should the United States Join the International Criminal Court?, 9
U.C. Davis J. Int’l L & Pol’y 35, 38 (2002).
35 Arthur W. Rovine, Memorandum to Congress on the ICC from Current and Past Presidents
of the ASIL, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 967, 967 (2001) (quoting a letter from former United States
ofªcials to U.S. Representative Tom DeLay).
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additional reason not to respond when our nation’s interests are
threatened.”36
American objections to the ICC all stem, in one form or another,
from perceived threats to United States sovereignty.37 At hearings on
the ICC held one week after the Rome Conference, Senator Rod
Grams stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “the
United States will not cede its sovereignty to an institution which claims
to have the power to override the U.S. legal system and pass judgment
on our foreign policy actions,” and Senator Larry Craig claimed that
the ICC represented “a fundamental threat to American sovereignty.”38
In an effort to clarify and analyze the United States’s concerns raised by
the ICC, this Part organizes the objections of the United States to the
ICC in six distinct but overlapping categories: institutional, constitu-
tional, doctrinal, security, prosecution, and symbolic.
A. Institutional Objections
Institutionally, the ICC is viewed by some as supplanting the U.N.
Security Council.39 According to the U.N. Charter, the Security Coun-
cil has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security . . .” and provides the Security Council with power
to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and . . . [to] decide what measures shall be
taken . . . .”40 The ICC, at least arguably, frustrates the U.N. Charter by
usurping this role from the Security Council and by denying the
United States its veto of Security Council measures.41 Accordingly, the
United States (and others) sought prior review by the Security Coun-
cil as a precondition for ICC proceedings.42 Absent a prior Security
Council imprimatur, action by the ICC strikes some as displacing the
role of the Security Council and nullifying the effect of the U.N.
Charter.43 Of course, the response to this point is that the require-
ment of Security Council permission prior to ICC action would effec-
                                                                                                                     
36Id.
37 See Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal
Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law 165 (2003).
38 Quoted in Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the
International Criminal Court, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 381, 385–86 (2002).
39 Amann & Sellers, supra note 38, at 384.
40 U.N. Charter arts. 24(1), 39.
41 See Amann & Sellers, supra note 38, at 386–87.
42 Id. at 387.
43See generally id.
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tively negate any authority the ICC could have as in independent tri-
bunal, particularly where an investigation or prosecution of a Security
Council member or its allies was deemed necessary.
B. Constitutional Objections
The ICC does not offer criminal procedures and protections that
coincide completely with those offered under the United States Con-
stitution. Most obviously, the ICC trial of an American need not (and
will not) take place in “the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.”44 Moreover, the ICC has no jury trial provi-
sion45 and does not protect against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, although it does acknowledge a modiªed form of the exclu-
sionary rule for improperly obtained evidence.46 Despite the presence
of many familiar, fundamental constitutional protections afforded to
criminal defendants under the United States Constitution and tradi-
tional American criminal procedure (such as Miranda-esque warnings,
the presumption of innocence, notice of charges, assistance of coun-
sel, prompt and public trial, modiªed confrontation and compulsory
process, a privilege against self-incrimination, and double jeopardy),47
the ICC does not protect Americans to the same degree that the
United States Constitution does.48
In addition to these more speciªc constitutional reservations,
there is a constitutional dimension to sovereignty itself, which some
would say American subjection to the ICC would contravene. The
British constitution is generally understood to grant Parliament the
unfettered authority to bind Britain and its subjects to supranational
jurisdiction as a condition of its constitutional authority. Put differ-
ently, the power of Parliament to submit Britain to the ICC is a dem-
onstration of Parliament’s constitutional sovereignty. Unlike the case
of the British Parliament, however, the very act of subjecting an
American citizen to ICC jurisdiction might be a violation of the
United States’s constitutional authority in the absence of a constitu-
tional amendment. Without amending the Constitution, some Ameri-
cans would claim that deference to the ICC is tantamount to the
                                                                                                                     
44 U.S. Const. amend. VI; cf. Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 3(1), 62.
45 See Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 39(2)(b)(ii), 74.
46 See id. art. 69(7).
47 See id. arts. 20, 55(2), 63, 66, 67.
48 See generally David M. Baronoff, Unbalance of Powers: The International Criminal Court’s
Potential to Upset the Founders’ Checks and Balances, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 800, 804 (2002).
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abandonment of republican self-government.49 According to this view,
the mere existence of the ICC (should the United States ever join it)
would constitute a challenge to American constitutional democracy,
because for the ªrst time in U.S. history, an institution outside the
United States government would have “the ultimate authority to judge
the policies adopted and implemented by the elected ofªcials of the
United States – the core attribute of sovereignty and the sine qua non
of democratic self-government.”50
It seems entirely plausible that American republican government
permits Congress to commit the United States, on behalf of the peo-
ple, to an international or supranational institution with genuine
inºuence over U.S. policy. There is nothing inherently undemocratic
about giving governmental representatives the authority to bind their
constituencies in ways that the constituents ªnd surprising or objec-
tionable. To borrow a phrase from the British context, so long as this
congressional authority is not viewed as “self-embracing,” there is no
threat to American sovereignty or democracy, because not all delega-
tions of sovereignty are derogations of sovereignty. Indeed, some
would say it is the essence of constitutional democracy that the major-
ity’s representatives may take certain actions to preserve and promote
constitutional values, fundamental rights, and the rule of law, despite
the majority’s disapproval.51
Another constitutional objection to the ICC concerns the legal
source of its judicial authority. If the United States Senate ratiªed the
Rome Statute, it might seem that the ICC is just another court that
Congress has chosen to accept through its Article II advice and consent
power52 rather than to create through its Article III power.53 The prob-
lem is that Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the
United States “in one supreme Court” and grants Congress the power
to ordain and establish “inferior Courts.” Joining the Rome Statute
would give the ICC jurisdiction over American citizens for acts commit-
ted on American soil. Given the theoretical possibility that the ICC
could prosecute an American for a crime committed in the United
                                                                                                                     
49See Amann & Sellers, supra note 38, at 400–02.
50 Lee A. Casey, The Case Against the International Criminal Court, 25 Fordham Int’l L. J.
840, 843–44 (2002).
51 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the Ameri-
can Constitution 15–26 (1996).
52 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating “He [the President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties . . . .”).
53 Id. art. III, § 1.
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States, and that the ICC’s decision could not be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, the ICC would be exercising the ju-
dicial authority of the United States in a manner not contemplated or
tolerated by the Constitution.54 Under these circumstances, the ICC
could not genuinely be considered an “inferior court.” The ICC’s rec-
ognition as a judicial authority over American citizens by the United
States government would seem to conºict with the constitutional man-
date that there be “one supreme Court.” Granting the ICC judicial
authority over American nationals in a manner consistent with the U.S.
Constitution would seem to require a constitutional amendment rather
than a treaty. Depending upon one’s point of view, which is likely to
reºect one’s national constitutional tradition, the need for a constitu-
tional amendment prior to American acceptance of the ICC under-
scores the advantage (or the disadvantage) of a written constitution.
One response to these constitutional objections is that they are
mistaken. Some view the protections afforded by the Rome Statute as
an international codiªcation of American criminal procedure protec-
tions, which are actually “somewhat more detailed and comprehensive
than those in the American Bill of Rights.”55 The Rome Statute pro-
tects American military personnel in ICC proceedings at least to the
same degree that the United States Constitution would protect them
at home.
Another response to these objections is not that they are mis-
taken but that they are misplaced. On this view, the appropriate legal
paradigm for evaluating the protections offered to potential Ameri-
can defendants under the Rome Statute is courts-martial not the fed-
eral courts. Military courts do not afford American citizens the same
constitutional protections as are available in federal courts; conse-
quently, constitutional objections—no matter how well founded they
might be for Americans tried in the traditional criminal justice sys-
tem—are inapplicable to the ICC’s prosecution and adjudication of
war crimes. Analogizing the ICC to American courts-martial, the pro-
tections afforded by the Rome Statute seem consistent with the
American military legal tradition.56
                                                                                                                     
54 See Casey, supra note 50 at 841–42.
55 Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 124, 131
(2001).
56 See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Constitution and the ICC, in The United States and
the International Criminal Court: National Security and International Law 119
(Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000); cf. Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The
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Finally, a response to the argument that the ICC is not an Article
III court is that the ICC does not exercise the judicial power of the
United States. The Rome Statute deªnes crimes, procedures, and in-
stitutions that exist independently of the United States Constitution
and United States law. Accordingly, there is no proper constitutional
objection to subjection of Americans to ICC jurisdiction because the
language of Article III and the authority of the federal courts are not
implicated by the language of the Rome Statute or by the existence of
the ICC.57
C. Doctrinal Objections
A central concern of the United States involves the ICC provision
granting the ICC jurisdiction over nationals of nonparty states who
are accused of crimes committed on the territory of states parties.58
According to settled and fundamental doctrines of international law,
a treaty is binding only upon the parties that sign and ratify it (unless
the treaty codiªes general customary international law principles).59
The subjection of nonparties to ICC jurisdiction seems to conºict
with this fundamental doctrine.60
There are three related responses to this objection. First, American
resistance to the existence of the ICC or to American participation in
the ICC could not prevent Americans from being tried by a foreign tri-
bunal if, for example, members of the United States military carrying
out operations on foreign soil were accused of one of the crimes within
the jurisdiction of the ICC (i.e., genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity). On the contrary, American military personnel who found
themselves in this situation would, according to principles of interna-
                                                                                                                     
Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court, 33 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 73, 119–26
(1995).
57 See generally Marquardt, supra note 56, at 101–08, 126–32.
58 See Rome Statute supra note 11, art. 12.
59 See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 34–
38, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This is sometimes expressed
through the maxims of pacta tertiis (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt) or pacta sunt servanda.
Ironically, the United States has signed, but not ratiªed, the Vienna Convention. See, e.g.,
United States. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 94 n.28 (2d Cir. 2003). This could be understood as
the United States’s refusal to accept the principle that a treaty binds only its signatories,
which would weaken American objections to the Rome Statute based upon this doctrinal
principle. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
60 See Scheffer, supra note 24, at 18.
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tional law, be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in
which the operations were conducted.61
Second, and related to the previous point, the ICC’s jurisdictional
mandate simply incorporates the traditional jurisdictional foundations
of nationality and territoriality. In other words, Article 12 merely allows
the ICC to do what national judiciaries commonly do: exercise jurisdic-
tion over their own nationals for crimes committed outside state bor-
ders and exercise jurisdiction over nationals from other states who
commit crimes within the subject state’s territory. These jurisdictional
principles of nationality and territoriality embraced by the ICC are fully
consistent with the law and practice of state judiciaries around the
world. The ICC serves, from a jurisdictional perspective, only as an in-
ternational supplement to the ordinary judicial authority of national
courts.62 Moreover, some scholars question whether Article 12 actually
violates the principle that treaties bind only parties. According to these
writers, the ICC does not violate this principle because “[t]he ICC stat-
ute provides a forum for the prosecution of individuals suspected of
having committed acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or war
crimes. It does not place any obligations upon non-party states unless
such states have consented to cooperate with the ICC.”63
Third, the United States has ratiªed several treaties that require
prosecution by states parties of any individual suspected of deªned
criminal activity, even if the accused’s home state has not ratiªed the
treaty. These treaties apparently conºict with the notion that a treaty
cannot authorize jurisdiction over nonparties, yet this did not prevent
the United States from executing these treaties.64 This raises doubts
about the gravity of American objections to the ICC grounded on its
purported violation of fundamental principles of international law.
One point that the second response to the American objection
seems to overlook is the potential for conºicts between state obliga-
tions under the Rome Statute and so-called “Article 98 agreements,”
which are bilateral treaties between the United States (or another
state) and a party to the Rome Statute that prevent surrender of
American citizens to the ICC without American consent.65 The United
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States maintains that these treaties are consistent with the language
and intent of Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute. There are some
doubts about whether Article 98 and its legislative history genuinely
anticipate or tolerate the blanket immunity provided by these Article
98 agreements. In addition, some view Article 98 agreements as “gall-
ing instances of U.S. double standards” and “blatant hypocrisy” given
that the United States demands that Serbia and Montenegro comply
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) while simultaneously insisting upon “its right to advance what
it conceives to be its own national interests vis-à-vis the ICC . . . .”66 Ar-
ticle 98 agreements highlight the intractable conºicts created by an
international treaty instrument that purports to permit jurisdiction
over nonparty actors. Those nonparties, particularly in the context of
an international military or political crisis, may fall under the custody
of states parties. If allegations are made that a nonparty actor is guilty
of a core crime, and that actor is in the custody of a state party, then
that state party will have to decide whether to turn the actor over to
the ICC for investigation and prosecution.
Americans who oppose the ICC would argue that there is a
signiªcant difference between Americans who are captured on foreign
soil being tried for alleged crimes by that foreign nation’s courts and
Americans being extradited to The Hague for trial before the ICC. The
power of a nation to exercise its territorial jurisdiction over Americans
who are accused of crimes allegedly committed on that nation’s soil
cannot seriously be questioned (although, in practice, the United
States might do so while negotiating for the release of American pris-
oners). But the legitimacy of an international tribunal that exercises
jurisdiction over citizens of a government that does not recognize the
tribunal’s authority, upon claims of criminal violations that the non-
party state may not accept (such as the ICC crime of aggression), raises
grave doubts about the tribunal’s rightful power. In this respect, Ameri-
can objectors might argue that the ICC suffers from precisely the same
defects of legal legitimacy as its predecessor at Nuremberg.
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D. Security Objections
Related to ICC jurisdiction over nonparties, the United States ar-
gued in Rome and subsequently maintained that this unprecedented
extension of international jurisdiction could signiªcantly restrict mili-
tary operations necessary to preserve American national security or to
restore or maintain peace in politically volatile regions. For example,
the United States maintains a wide-ranging commitment to pledge its
forces to peacekeeping missions around the world. So this raises a not
unlikely possibility:
American servicemen on duty in the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf
conºict or in the operations in Somalia would be subject to
frivolous charges raised in the [International Criminal] Court
by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein or Somali leader General
Aidid solely to deºect international criticism from their own
egregious behavior. Then, in order to avoid the possibility of
‘malicious prosecution’ of this nature, the U.S. reduces its
commitment to participate in crucial international peace-
keeping missions, thereby increasing the risk of global insta-
bility and war. In particular, this jurisdictional element has led
to the United States seeking and securing immunization from
ICC prosecution prior to committing troops for international
peacekeeping missions.67
These concerns are not only raised by politicians and others who op-
pose any form of international inºuence on U.S. policymaking. Am-
bassador David Scheffer, who headed the U.S. delegation at the Rome
conference, also considers the concern about the threat of malicious
prosecutions inhibiting United States participation in international
peacekeeping missions signiªcant.68
                                                                                                                     
67 David, supra note 4, at 357 (footnote omitted).
68 See Scheffer, supra note 24, at 19 (“Equally troubling are the implications of Article
12 for the future willingness of the United States and other governments to take signiªcant
risks to intervene in foreign lands in order to save human lives or to restore international
or regional peace and security. The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particu-
larly for nonparties to the treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful, but highly controver-
sial and inherently risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights and world peace
so desperately seek from the United States and other military powers. There will be
signiªcant new legal and political risks in such interventions, which up to this point have
been mostly shielded from politically motivated charges.”); William K. Lietzau, Interna-
tional Criminal Law After Rome: Concerns From a U.S. Military Perspective, 64 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 119, 125 (2001) (“The Rome Treaty will become the single most effective brake on
2006] Britain, the United States and the International Criminal Court 15
Marcella David addresses this concern by evaluating American
participation in peacekeeping missions in Iraq, Bosnia, and Sudan.
For each intervention, she asks whether, had the Rome Statute been
in force at the time, the United States would have been unfairly re-
quired to defend itself against specious charges of aggression, unfairly
required to defend itself against politically-motivated charges of war
crimes, or subjected to inconsistent obligations arising from the U.N.
Security Council and the ICC.69 She concludes that American opera-
tions in Iraq could conceivably raise potential aggression and war
crimes charges but no obvious inconsistencies between U.N. and ICC
obligations.70 David believes American intervention in Bosnia might
support a weak prima facie claim of aggression but not a war crime
charge and no inconsistent U.N. and ICC obligations.71 Finally, David
determines that American actions in Sudan would expose the United
States to politically-motivated prosecutions based on unfounded
claims of aggression and war crimes.72 Notwithstanding the belief of
some Americans that David’s analysis simply conªrms their reserva-
tions about the ICC, she believes that, in the end, the ICC would ac-
tually reinforce U.N. commitments to international peace and secu-
rity. For some Americans, though, the problem is that David bases her
conclusion on her assessment that “where the United States unilater-
ally resorts to armed force on a questionable or contested factual rec-
ord, or in non-traditional responses to acts of aggression against it, its
actions may subject it to scrutiny by the International Criminal
Court.”73 These individuals object to the ICC (and, at times, the U.N.
itself) for this very reason: in their view, no entity other than the
United States government can or should decide when or how the
United States will defend itself and pursue its national interests.
E. Prosecution Objections
A concern closely related to the previous discussion addresses the
possibility that the ICC might be used to pursue political agendas
rather than war criminals. The United States sees itself as a likely target
for politically-motivated prosecutions before the ICC and is therefore
                                                                                                                     
international and regional peacekeeping in the 21st century.” (quoting Ambassador Schef-
fer’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)).
69 David, supra note 4, at 374.
70 Id. at 375–81.
71 Id. at 382–84.
72 Id. at 384–86.
73 Id. at 395.
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reluctant to support the creation of a tribunal that might be manipu-
lated out of such political motivations. Additionally, the United States
objects to the ability of the ICC prosecutor to initiate an investigation
even in the absence of any state party or Security Council complaint or
reference.74 For many members of the United States military this is the
insurmountable obstacle to the United States signing the Rome Statute
or complying with the ICC. As Lieutenant Colonel William Lietzau puts
it:
Because the jurisdictional regime does not adequately pro-
tect U.S. troops and commanders from politically motivated
prosecutions, the United States cannot sign the treaty. . . .
[T]he Rome negotiators settled on a regime that fell short of
U.S. objectives to maintain certain jurisdictional control over
its own forces. . . . Referrals initiating such [ICC] jurisdiction
can derive from any of three sources: the U.N. Security
Council, a state party to the Statute, or the prosecutor acting
in his or her independent capacity. The U.S. military has
been much criticized for its stance on this critical aspect of
the ICC Statute, but what the critics sometimes fail to recog-
nize are the unique and vital national security responsibili-
ties of the U.S. armed forces and the consequences of their
front-line role in carrying out the nation’s national security
strategy. . . . [N]o other state regularly has nearly 200,000
troops outside its borders, either forward deployed or en-
gaged in one of several operations designed to preserve in-
ternational peace and security. . . . Soldiers deployed far
from home need to do their jobs without exposure to politi-
cized proceedings.75
Other United States military personnel, such as Major General Wil-
liam Nash (Retired), point out that few foreign nations have accepted
American assertions of exemption from ICC jurisdiction.76 So in the
event that an ICC investigation or prosecution required compliance
by foreign states or actors, American opposition to the ICC is unlikely
to have much effect.77 Moreover, the military might have an interest
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in supporting the ICC because American forces serving overseas are
at the greatest risk of becoming victims of war crimes. So it could be
in the interest of the military to see war crimes investigated, prose-
cuted, and punished as extensively and vigorously as possible.78
Some scholars and politicians argue further that the admissibility
constraint on ICC jurisdiction—that the ICC cannot assume jurisdic-
tion over a matter unless a state’s domestic courts cannot or will not
do so—should quell American concerns about possible threats to na-
tional sovereignty or politically motivated prosecutions.79 These indi-
viduals note that the conditional nature of ICC authority meets the
concerns of the British government and so it should satisfy the United
States as well.80 One interesting and less-often noted aspect of the
admissibility precondition to ICC jurisdiction, however, is that the ICC
may retain jurisdiction over a matter, even if a proceeding was con-
ducted by the judiciary of a state party, if the ICC determines that the
state proceeding was undertaken “for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the [International Criminal] Court . . . there has been
an unjustiªed delay in the [state] proceedings . . . [or] the proceed-
ings were not or are not being conducted independently or impar-
tially . . . .”81 This effectively authorizes the ICC to review independ-
ently state party court proceedings involving a core crime for
impartiality, delay, or pretense.82
F. Symbolic Objections
The ªnal, and in some ways the most fundamental, U.S. objection
to the ICC is captured by the spectacle of an American President or
high-ranking military or political ofªcial standing trial before a non-
American tribunal. The ICC does not recognize claims of ofªcial im-
munity,83 and it is unclear whether the ICC would honor a national
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grant of amnesty that could shield individuals from ICC prosecution.84
Accordingly, the concern about the spectacle and its symbolic and prac-
tical effects on American position, prestige, and power is not merely
hypothetical. Its very possibility is intolerable to the sensibilities of
many Americans. Of course, the response to this objection is that the
prospective national embarrassment of a leader being prosecuted be-
fore the ICC is itself a salutary deterrent effect of the tribunal’s exis-
tence. This is hardly a basis for American objections to the ICC.
IV. National Sovereignty in a Global Community
One plausible explanation for the disparate reactions of Britain
and the United States toward the ICC might be found in their reac-
tions to the perceived sovereignty threats posed by the EU and the
U.N., respectively. Britain has, after some constitutional indigestion,
accepted the supremacy of EU law in two judicially relevant ways.
First, Britain accepts—as all EU members ultimately must—the su-
pranational jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).85 Given that British
citizens and the British government may appear as parties before the
ECJ and the ECHR, and that the decisions of those courts are binding
upon Britain’s national judiciary, Britain has acknowledged the judi-
cial authority over its citizens of courts outside its borders.86 Second,
EU law is directly enforceable by the national courts of Britain. So
British courts apply external legal doctrine that has been incorpo-
rated by reference into British law through, among other things, the
Human Rights Act of 1998.87 As a result of these two factors, Britain
likely does not view the ICC as a challenge to the authority or auton-
omy of its governmental structure, in part because it has made its
(sometimes uneasy) peace with its presence within the EU.
Unlike Britain and the EU, inºuential elements of the United
States government continue to view the U.N. with measured circum-
spection.88 The United States tends to be most supportive of U.N. ac-
tion when that action has no direct repercussions for U.S. foreign pol-
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icy or when it would serve the interests of the United States.89 Moreo-
ver, Americans tend to view their courts and their law as entirely
sufªcient for the expression and maintenance of legal doctrine and
government accountability. Indeed, Supreme Court justices still have
serious reservations about citing, to say nothing of following, deci-
sions of foreign courts such as the ECHR.90
Notwithstanding these differing perceptions of place in the in-
ternational community, the Anglo-American commitment to the rule
of law both within and beyond national borders offers a meaningful
incentive to support an international court of criminal justice. In the
end, as Gary Bass explains, “[A] war crimes tribunal is an extension of
the rule of law from the domestic sphere to the international sphere
. . . . [T]he serious pursuit of international justice rests on principled
legalist beliefs held by only a few liberal governments.”91
Britain and the United States are two of these few liberal gov-
ernments. Britain’s preference for execution rather than legalism af-
ter World War II was the sole aberration in the commitment of liberal
states to legalism when confronting war crimes.92 The United States’s
rejection of the ICC is now, arguably, the second. The Anglo-
American commitment to the rule of law and the historical contribu-
tion of both nations to the development of due process and norms of
justice enforced by an independent judiciary has, in the past, an-
chored a shared commitment to legalism in the pursuit of interna-
tional justice.93 Britain and the United States have supported interna-
tional war crimes tribunals largely out of a belief in the fundamental
fairness of their own tradition of constitutional protection of criminal
defendants and the intrinsic value of their principles and process as a
means of achieving justice domestically and internationally.94 At Nur-
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emberg, the United States had to persuade (or remind) Britain that
trials alone were the only means of achieving justice for war crimes
consistent with Anglo-American legalism.95 Perhaps Britain needs to
return the favor with respect to the ICC.96
Inasmuch as Anglo-American dedication to international norms
of justice enforced by international tribunals derives, at least in part,
from the recognition and reinforcement of domestic rule of law val-
ues in those international norms and tribunals, it is reasonable to see
Anglo-American legalism itself as a manifestation of national sover-
eignty. After all, “sovereignty does not arise in a vacuum, but is consti-
tuted by the recognition of the international community, which makes
its recognition conditional on certain standards . . . .”97 Just as Ameri-
can democracy is theoretically predicated upon a relinquishment of a
measure of liberty in exchange for security and individual autonomy
in a larger social context, so too can support for the ICC be viewed as
the relinquishment of a measure of sovereignty in exchange for secu-
rity and international respect in a global context. Put differently, sup-
porting the ICC does not just mean sacriªcing sovereignty, it also en-
hances sovereignty.98
This view of sovereignty depends upon a particular view of the
nature of political power. Power is more than the ability of one state
to bend other states to its will through coercion; it is also the ability of
one state to persuade other states that their interests align. In other
words, soft power can, in certain circumstances, be more effective
than hard power.99 If the United States will achieve more, including
the achievement of more of its own political goals, in a world that re-
spects its leadership, then ongoing opposition to the ICC may engen-
der a very real loss of American inºuence and, ultimately, of Ameri-
can sovereignty and security.100 The international perception that
United States opposition to the ICC tarnishes the longstanding
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American commitment to the rule of law inside and outside its bor-
ders could limit the United States’s ability to inºuence international
affairs in ways that ultimately will detract from its sovereignty.101
Conclusion
The United States’s rejection of the ICC has angered its allies,
increased resentment toward the United States around the world,
raised doubts about American commitments to the preservation of
the rule of law nationally and internationally, and seemingly distanced
the United States from otherwise shared Anglo-American values of
legalism and support of norms and institutions of international jus-
tice. All of these factors inevitably lead one to wonder whether the
current position of the United States toward the ICC is politically
prudent. Some commentators suggest that a less unilateral position
toward the ICC would serve American interests for four reasons: (1)
the practical risk of prosecution of American citizens before the ICC
is extremely remote,102 (2) American negotiating inºuence would not
be weakened in contexts such as the Security Council, where U.S. re-
jection of the ICC, among other things, led to international reluc-
tance to support American military intervention in Iraq,103 (3) the
current U.S. policy has ºoundered, because of the backlash against
Article 98 Agreements, the refusal of most signiªcant powers to sign
them, and the inability of the United States to alter the fundamental
structure of the ICC or to inºuence policy relative to the ICC now
that the United States is no longer a party to the Rome Statute,104 and
(4) the apparent inconsistency between America’s commitment to
rule of law values and its unwillingness to comply with the ICC as an
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institution dedicated to the preservation of human rights through
international legal norms has eroded America’s political and moral
capital as a leader in international affairs.105
Just as Britain’s acceptance of the Ottawa Convention inºuenced
the United States’s decision not to employ landmines during joint
military operations in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001,106 so too
can Britain’s decision to join the ICC inºuence American actions dur-
ing joint military operations. To the extent that the very existence of
the ICC promotes a “culture of accountability,”107 the ICC may exert
an inºuence over American policy even if Americans are never sub-
ject to ICC jurisdiction. Of course, this inºuence on American policy
will strike those Americans who oppose the ICC as the realization of
their initial concerns, and this inºuence will strike American support-
ers of the ICC as mitigation of their misgivings over U.S. withdrawal
from the ICC. In the end, the ICC raises the question of whether con-
stitutionalism is a domestic or a universal conception.108 The ICC tests
the Anglo-American commitment to the rule of law, in part, by asking
what law will rule. Britain and the United States share a cultural, his-
torical, theoretical, and doctrinal commitment to the rule of law and
this commitment to legalism has grounded Anglo-American support
for international war crimes tribunals in the past. But Britain seems
more willing than the United States to accept that, at least where the
ICC is concerned, the law that will rule Britain and its leaders and
citizens can sometimes be made by an institution beyond its borders,
while the United States remains committed to the rule of law solely as
deªned and limited by the law of the United States.
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